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What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia 
Long-Arm Statute 
Ryan T. Holte* 
INTRODUCTION 
With over 86 million active members, quarterly revenues 
over $1.2 billion, and 113 million concurrent listings,1 it is 
little wonder that eBay2 transactions generate litigation. 
Moreover, it is such an easy and popular tool for an ordinary 
consumer to buy or sell goods that the legal implications of 
using the site are often overlooked. Few eBay users recognize 
that the simple sale of their old golf clubs, baseball cards, or 
used car could result in a mandatory court appearance on the 
opposite side of the country, answering to a buyer who wants 
more than positive feedback. 
The laws which subject these sellers to foreign 
jurisdictions differ from state to state and are known as “long-
arm statutes.”3 With the popularity of e-commerce sites 
growing4 and the jurisdiction of state long-arm statues 
increasing, this issue is rapidly becoming more important. 
States may be divided into “do or do-not-sell” classes such that 
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 1. EBAY MARKETPLACES FACT SHEET 1 (2008), available at 
http://news.ebay.com/fastfacts.cfm (follow “eBay Marketplaces Fast 
Facts” hyperlink). 
 2. EBay Home Page, http://www.ebay.com. 
 3. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 961 (8th ed. 2004). 
 4. See EBAY MARKETPLACES FACT SHEET, supra note 1 (showing 
continuous growth in the number of active users and listings). 
HOLTE RT.  What is Really Fair: Internet Sales and the Georgia Long-Arm Statute.  MINN. 
J.L. SCI. & TECH. 2009;10(2): 567-590. 
568 MINN. J. L. SCI. & TECH.  [Vol. 10:2 
 
 
eBay members and other online sellers may target buyers that 
have a lower risk of subjecting the seller to legal liability.  A 
national seller treating buyers differently based on the state 
they reside in is not a new concept,5 and with the increase in 
online sales and the litigation associated with those sales, 
discrimination toward buyers based on state long-arm statutes 
is likely to follow. 
A recent example of an eBay seller being sued in a foreign 
jurisdiction based on a sale made on the eBay auction site is 
the 2006 Georgia Court of Appeals case Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. 
v. Grieves.6  In Aero a Florida company sold a 2001 BMW car 
to a Georgia resident for nearly $32,000.7 After receiving the 
vehicle, the buyer filed suit in Georgia against the company, 
Aero Toy Store, for making numerous misrepresentations 
about the car.8 When Aero moved to dismiss the suit for lack of 
personal jurisdiction, the trial court found, and the court of 
appeals affirmed, that Aero had sufficient minimum contacts 
with Georgia to authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the company under its long-arm statute.9 
This article analyzes the current issue of online merchants 
being forced to defend themselves in foreign jurisdictions 
during litigation concerning online sales. Part I describes the 
history of personal jurisdiction from its nineteenth century 
concerns with territoriality to the twentieth century minimum 
contacts standard to other, more recent developments. Part II 
summarizes personal jurisdiction and minimum contacts as 
applied to the Internet generally and discusses whether 
Internet sales contain sufficient minimum contacts to satisfy 
the constitutional prerequisites for the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction over the seller. Part III analyzes the Georgia long-
arm statute as it relates to jurisdiction over persons 
transacting sales over the Internet. Finally, Part IV examines 
the policies for and against allowing the Georgia long-arm 
                                                          
 5. For example, national sellers may avoid selling certain animal 
products, all terrain vehicles, and weapons to residents of certain states 
based on the states’ respective endangered species laws, off-road vehicle 
regulations, and criminal weapon codes. 
 6. Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2006). 
 7. Id. at 735. 
 8. Id. 
 9. Id. at 735–36, 741. 
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statute to pull foreign sellers into Georgia before 
recommending clear guidelines to the Georgia Legislature if it 
were to amend the long-arm statute.  
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF PERSONAL JURISDICTION 
Before analyzing how the Georgia long-arm statute relates 
to Internet transactions, we must first understand what 
personal jurisdiction is, and how the current long-arm statute 
has been interpreted generally by the Georgia Supreme Court. 
A. TERRITORIALITY AND PENNOYER 
Personal jurisdiction is defined as a “court’s power to bring 
a person into its adjudicative process; jurisdiction over a 
defendant’s personal rights, rather than merely over property 
interests.”10 The Supreme Court introduced the concept of 
personal jurisdiction in 1877 in Pennoyer v. Neff.11  In 
Pennoyer both parties claimed title to a piece of land in 
Oregon.12  Pennoyer asserted title under a deed resulting from 
a sheriff’s sale of property to collect on a judgment entered in 
Oregon against Neff, a non-resident of Oregon who claimed 
that he was not properly served with process for the 
proceeding that resulted in the judgment.13 The Supreme 
Court determined that Pennoyer’s assertion of title was invalid 
because the sheriff’s sale was unauthorized.14 The Court held 
that Neff had not been properly served in the underlying case—
resulting in the personal judgment against him—because he 
had not been personally served with process in Oregon15 (but 
instead had only received constructive service by 
publication16). The Court reasoned that to assure “proper 
protection to citizens of other states,” due process required 
that a court obtain personal jurisdiction over a nonresident 
                                                          
 10. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 870 (8th ed. 2004). 
 11. Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1877); see McGee v. Int’l Life Ins. 
Co., 355 U.S. 220, 222 (1957) (“Since Pennoyer v. Neff, this Court has 
held that the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment places 
some limit on the power of state courts to enter binding judgments 
against persons not served with process within their boundaries.” (citation 
omitted)). 
 12. Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 719. 
 13. Id. at 719–20. 
 14. Id. at 734. 
 15. Id. 
 16. Id. at 720. 
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only by personal service of process within the forum state.17 
In addition to setting the foundation for personal 
jurisdiction jurisprudence, Pennoyer “served another key 
function as it placed in personam jurisdictional analysis 
squarely under the aegis of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due 
Process Clause and provided support for the Court’s 
subsequent declaration that jurisdiction based on ‘physical 
presence’ ipso facto satisfies due process.”18 From 1877 
forward, courts equated their jurisdictional reach with a 
constitutional Fourteenth Amendment analysis based on the 
physical presence of a person in the forum.19 
As innovations in transportation and interstate commerce 
increased at the turn of the twentieth century, courts 
developed exceptions to allow “jurisdictional assertions based 
on the type of dispute rather than a general adjudicative power 
over the individual defendant.”20 One example was the 
Supreme Court’s 1927 decision in Hess v. Pawloski.21  In Hess 
the Court upheld a state statute which declared that driving on 
a state highway is the equivalent of appointing an official of 
that state as one’s process agent and thus confers personal 
jurisdiction over the driver.22 By 1945 there were so many 
exceptions to the physical presence requirement due to 
technological advancements and increased commerce that the 
Court decided to embrace a new jurisdictional theory. 
B. INTERNATIONAL SHOE AND THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 
As the usefulness of the physical presence standard 
decreased, the 1945 International Shoe Court formulated a 
more expansive test for the propriety of the extraterritorial 
                                                          
 17. See id. at 726. 
 18. Jeffrey J. Utermohle, Maryland’s Diminished Long-Arm Jurisdiction 
in the Wake of Zavian v. Foudy, 31 U. BALT. L. REV. 1, 5 (2001) (citing 
Pennoyer, 95 U.S. at 733; Burnham v. Superior Court, 495 U.S. 604, 619 
(1990)). 
 19. Id. 
 20. Charles W. “Rocky” Rhodes, The Predictability Principle in Personal 
Jurisdiction Doctrine: A Case Study on the Effects of a “Generally” Too 
Broad, but “Specifically” Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts, 57 
BAYLOR L. REV. 135, 144 (2005). 
 21. Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U.S. 352 (1927). 
 22. Id. at 356–57.  Jurisdiction was only appropriate for events 
relating to driving on a highway, however.  Id. at 354–56. 
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exercise of personal jurisdiction.23 The new due process 
standard to subject a defendant to a personal judgment when 
he is not physically present, was that the defendant must have 
“certain minimum contacts with [the forum] such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice.’”24 Thus a defendant may be 
subject to a personal judgment in a foreign state based on 
some activity other than that involving his physical presence.25 
Courts analyzing the minimum contacts standard use a 
two-step approach. First, they determine if minimum contacts 
exist between the defendant and the forum, and second, they 
analyze considerations of “fair play and substantial justice.”26  
Thus, International Shoe embraced a new jurisdictional theory 
founded upon the fairness of the exercise of jurisdiction 
instead of territoriality.27 
In light of the expanded constitutional understanding of 
personal jurisdiction announced in International Shoe, all fifty 
states and the District of Columbia enacted long-arm statutes 
to enable their courts to hale a nonresident into the forum to 
defend against a lawsuit.28 Some states chose to extend their 
courts’ jurisdictional reach to the full extent authorized by the 
Supreme Court, while others tailored their statutes to the 
specific requirements of their citizenry.29 
                                                          
 23. Utermohle, supra note 18, at 6. 
 24. Int’l Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting 
Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
 25. Susan Nauss Exon, A New Shoe is Needed to Walk Through 
Cyberspace Jurisdiction, 11 ALB. L.J. SCI. & TECH. 1, 5 (2000). 
 26. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 
(1980) (quoting Int’l Shoe, 326 U.S. at 316, and noting that courts seek to 
afford defendants protection from unreasonable and unfair litigation). 
 27. Rhodes, supra note 20, at 147. 
 28. Utermohle, supra note 18, at 6 (citing 16 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., 
MOORE’S  FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 108.60[1] (3rd ed. 2003)). 
 29. Id., at 6–7. 
Not all long-arm statutes are created equal: the overwhelming 
majority of states...extend personal jurisdiction to the full extent 
permitted by the due process decisions of the Supreme Court.  On 
the other hand, a small minority of states implement their long-
arm authority more narrowly than due process allows.  For 
instance, New York clings to an anachronistic approach best 
described as ‘half-way between Pennoyer and International Shoe. 
Id.  
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C. PERSONAL JURISDICTION IN GEORGIA 
The Georgia long-arm statute is the general source of 
statutory authority for the exercise of personal jurisdiction 
over nonresidents.30 The statute reads in part: 
A court of this state may exercise personal jurisdiction over any 
nonresident or his executor or administrator, as to a cause of 
action arising from any of the acts, omissions, ownership, use, or 
possession enumerated in this Code section, in the same manner 
as if he were a resident of the state, if in person or through an 
agent, he: 
(1) Transacts any business within this state; 
(2) Commits a tortious act or omission within this state, except as 
to a cause of action for defamation of character arising from the 
act; 
(3) Commits a tortious injury in this state caused by an act or 
omission outside this state if the tort-feasor regularly does or 
solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course of 
conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or 
consumed or services rendered in this state; 
(4) Owns, uses, or possesses any real property situated within 
this state . . . .31 
The portion of the statute pertinent to the e-commerce 
question at hand is subsection (1): “Transacts any business 
within this state.”32 
Before 2005, Georgia courts interpreted the “[t]ransacts 
any business” language of the long-arm statute to apply only 
to contract actions.33 An early Georgia Supreme Court case, 
O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., illustrates this contract 
requirement while placing an emphasis on required contacts 
and narrowing the scope of the statute within available due 
process limits.34 The Jonas case concerned a contract, 
executed outside of Georgia, between a nonresident defendant 
                                                          
 30. Steven W. Hardy, Personal Jurisdiction in Georgia Over Claims 
Arising from Business Conducted Over the Internet, GA. B.J., June 2006, at 
21. 
 31. GA. CODE ANN. § 9-10-91 (2007).  Subsection (5) solely concerns 
issues related to divorce and has been omitted.  Id. § 9-10-91(5). 
 32. Id. § 9-10-91(1). 
 33. Jeffrey A. Van Detta & Shiv K. Kapoor, Extraterritorial Personal 
Jurisdiction for the Twenty-First Century: A Case Study Reconceptualizing 
the Typical Long-Arm Statute to Codify and Refine International Shoe After 
its First Sixty Years, 3 SETON HALL CIRCUIT REV. 339, 361 (2007). 
 34. O.N. Jonas Co. v. B & P Sales Corp., 206 S.E.2d 437, 439 (Ga. 
1974). 
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and a Georgia sales corporation.35 In holding there was no 
personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court of Georgia stated 
“there were no negotiations or contracts entered into in 
Georgia with respect to the goods that are the subject matter of 
these actions.”36 Since the Jonas purchases were made by 
telephone and mail, Georgia courts held in subsequent cases 
that telephone, mail, and e-mail communications from a 
nonresident defendant did not confer personal jurisdiction 
under subsection (1).37 This limited reading remained in effect 
for some time, and was only expanded in very limited 
applications in lawsuits initiated by banks.38 However, in 
2005, the Jonas principles, and all the subsequent cases that 
relied on it, were overturned in the landmark case, Innovative 
Clinical & Consulting Services (“ICCS”). 39 
In ICCS a Georgia resident had brought claims for breach 
of contract, fraud, and conversion against non-resident First 
National Bank of Ames.40 The bank had a security interest in a 
lease agreement between Innovative and a financing 
corporation, which was also a customer of the bank.41 The 
Georgia Court of Appeals relied on precedent specifying the 
requirement of a contract and therefore applied subsection (1) 
to the breach of contract claim only.42 The court determined 
ICCS’s breach of contract claim was not even “remotely related 
to the security interest taken by the bank.”43 The Georgia 
                                                          
 35. Id. at 438. 
 36. Id. at 439. 
 37. Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 363 (citing Catholic 
Stewardship Consultant, Inc. v. Ruotolo Assocs., Inc., 608 S.E.2d 1 (Ga. 
Ct. App. 2004); First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & 
Consulting Servs., L.L.C. (First Nat’l Bank I), 598 S.E.2d 530 (Ga. Ct. App. 
2004); ETS Payphone, Inc. v. TK Indus., 513 S.E.2d 257 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1999); Burt v. Energy Servs. Inv. Corp., 427 S.E.2d 576 (Ga. Ct. App. 
1993); Commercial Food Specialties, Inc. v. Quality Food Equip. Co., 338 
S.E.2d 865 (Ga. Ct. App. 1985); Graphic Mach., Inc. v. H.M.S. Direct Mail 
Serv., Inc., 281 S.E.2d 343 (Ga. Ct. App. 1981)). 
 38. See Ga. R.R. Bank & Trust Co. v. Barton, 315 S.E.2d 17 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 1984) (expanding the scope of the long arm statute by allowing for 
jurisdiction over nonresidents purposefully availing themselves of the 
protections of Georgia law by doing some act in the state and considering 
whether there was “substantial” effect on the forum from the contact). 
 39. Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank 
of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352 (Ga. 2005). 
 40. First Nat’l Bank I, 598 S.E.2d at 532. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. at 534. 
 43. Id. 
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Supreme Court granted certiorari “to address preconceived 
inconsistencies in  . . . precedents defining the scope of 
personal jurisdiction that Georgia courts may exercise over 
nonresidents pursuant to. . . the Georgia long-arm statute.”44 
The Georgia Supreme Court’s opinion stated that, because 
an earlier case interpreted subsections (2) and (3) of the long-
arm statute literally, courts should apply that same 
interpretation to subsection (1).  Since “[n]othing in subsection 
(1) limits its application to contract cases”45 or “requires the 
physical presence of the nonresident in Georgia or minimizes 
the import of a nonresident’s intangible contacts with the 
State,”46 under a literal reading, these limitations do not 
apply.47 Because the only limitation remaining was that of the 
Constitution, the court held that subsection (1) should 
henceforth reach “to the maximum extent permitted by 
procedural due process.”48 The court explicitly “overrule[d] all 
prior cases that fail[ed] to accord the appropriate breadth to 
the construction of the ‘transacting any business’ language” of 
subsection (1).49 Finally, the court vacated and remanded the 
case to the Court of Appeals to “fully consider whether the trial 
court had personal jurisdiction over the [nonresident] bank 
under [subsection (1)].”50 Unsurprisingly, the Court of Appeals 
subsequently found that the trial court had personal 
jurisdiction over the bank.51 
II. PERSONAL JURISDICTION, MINIMUM CONTACTS, AND 
                                                          
 44. Innovative, 620 S.E.2d at 353. 
 45. Id. at 355. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. at 356. 
 51. First Nat’l Bank of Ames v. Innovative Clinical & Consulting 
Servs., L.L.C., (First Nat’l Bank II) 634 S.E.2d 88, 89 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006).  
The court found that “the bank’s ‘postal, telephone, and other intangible 
Georgia contacts’ were sufficient under the new broader interpretation of 
subsection (1),” Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 368 (quoting First 
Nat’l Bank II, 634 S.E.2d at 89), and that “the exercise of personal 
jurisdiction was within the limits of constitutional due process, because 
‘the bank’s “business” was not brought to Georgia through a “unilateral 
action” of ICCS.’” Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 368 n.116 
(quoting First Nat’l Bank II, 634 S.E.2d at 89, and Burger King Corp. v. 
Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 474–75 (1985)). 
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THE INTERNET  GENERALLY 
Since it has been established, through ICCS, that the 
Georgia long-arm statute’s reach shall be to the full extent 
allowed by due process, before analyzing how Georgia courts 
define due process as it relates to Internet contacts, we should 
first look to influential national cases describing how due 
process applies to Internet contacts. 
A. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF INTERNET CONTACTS AND THE 
ZIPPO TEST 
Early cases regarding Internet jurisdiction can be 
described as inconsistent at best.  One of the first to address 
the issue of personal jurisdiction based on Internet contacts 
was Inset Systems v. Instruction Set, Inc.52 In that case, the 
defendant, a Massachusetts company, was subject to personal 
jurisdiction in Connecticut after posting advertisements on its 
website and offering a toll-free phone number.53 The court 
reasoned that because the defendant’s website was designed to 
communicate with people in every state, posting information 
on the website was the same as directing advertisements 
toward every state.54 Because the defendant’s advertisements 
were accessible to all Internet users in Connecticut, it had 
“purposefully availed itself of the privilege of doing business” in 
the state.55 The fact that the defendant had no employees or 
offices in Connecticut nor conducted any regular business 
there was irrelevant to the court.56 Since the court reasoned 
that the posting of information on a website was analogous to 
television or radio advertisements, it inferred that Internet 
users were being repetitively solicited with the information.57 
“Fortunately for Internet merchants, later decisions have 
taken the Internet’s unique qualities into consideration and 
required proof that the defendant’s Internet activities were 
                                                          
 52. Inset Sys., Inc. v. Instruction Set, Inc., 937 F. Supp. 161 (D. 
Conn. 1996). 
 53. Id. at 164. 
 54. See id. at 165. 
 55. Id. 
 56. See id. at 162–63. 
 57. See id. at 164; Aaron S. Guin, Transactions: Internet Jurisdiction 
and Forum Selection Clauses, 2 TRANSACTIONS: TENN. J. BUS. L. 33, 35 
(2000) (stating that the Inset court “expanded the understanding of 
purposeful availment to its extreme conclusion”). 
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purposely directed at the forum state.”58 In Bensusan 
Restaurant Corp. v. King,59 a New York federal court held that 
to extend jurisdiction over the defendant, a Missouri club 
owner, on the basis of the club’s website alone would violate 
the Due Process Clause.60 The court reasoned “that posting 
information on the Internet is more analogous to placing a 
product into the stream of commerce, which may be ‘felt 
nationwide’ but without more does not establish minimum 
contacts.”61 Because the defendant neither conducted 
business in New York nor directed New York residents to his 
club’s website, the court declined to exercise jurisdiction.62 
Finally, in 1997, the U.S. District Court for the Western 
District of Pennsylvania issued a landmark opinion that set 
forth a new method for conducting the minimum contacts 
analysis which has been cited in almost every Internet 
jurisdiction case since.63 The case, Zippo Manufacturing Co. v. 
Zippo Dot Com, Inc.,64 concerned a dispute between the Zippo 
lighter company, a Pennsylvania corporation, and Zippo Dot 
Com, a California-based news service that obtained domain 
name registration for such sites as “zippo.com,” “zippo.net,” 
and “zipponews.com.”65 The District Court found jurisdiction 
proper even though the California resident did not have any 
physical presence in the forum state.66 
                                                          
 58. Quinn K. Nemeyer, Comment, Don’t Hate the Player, Hate the 
Game: Applying the Traditional Concepts of General Jurisdiction to Internet 
Contacts, 52 LOY. L. REV. 147, 168 (2006). 
 59. Bensusan Rest. Corp. v. King, 937 F. Supp. 295 (S.D.N.Y. 1996) 
(involving trademark infringement claims between the plaintiff, owner of 
the “Blue Note” jazz club in New York, and the defendant, owner of the 
“Blue Note” jazz club in Missouri). 
 60. Id. at 300–01. 
 61. Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 169 (quoting Bensusan Rest. Corp., 
937 F. Supp. at 301); see also Asahi Metal Indus. Co. v. Superior Court of 
California, 480 U.S. 102, 112 (1987) (“The placement of a product into the 
stream of commerce, without more, is not an act of the defendant 
purposefully directed toward the forum State.”). 
 62. Bensusan Rest. Corp., 937 F. Supp. at 301. 
 63. See Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 171 (“[T]he Zippo sliding scale has 
been widely adopted as the appropriate approach for evaluating Internet-
based forum contacts in the context of specific jurisdiction.”). 
 64. Zippo Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com, Inc., 952 F. Supp. 1119 (W.D. 
Pa. 1997). 
 65. Id. at 1121. 
 66. Id. at 1126–27. 
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The Zippo court’s analysis concerned “the nature and 
quality of commercial activity that an entity conducts over the 
Internet.”67 The court distinguished between three broad 
categories of websites based on their interactive and 
commercial characteristics, and created a sliding scale 
analysis for distinguishing between the sites.68 At one end of 
the scale are websites that conduct business over the Internet 
and actively target a forum state through advertising efforts 
and information collection.69 At the other end of the scale are 
websites that are “passive” and merely include information or 
advertisements.70 Finally, the third category of websites, in the 
middle of the sliding scale, are interactive websites which allow 
a user to exchange information and possibly conduct business 
with a host computer.71 
An example of a website actively targeting a forum state, 
the first end of the Zippo scale, is the defendant’s site in 
CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson.72 There, the Internet activities 
were clearly aimed at the forum.73 In its opinion finding 
jurisdiction proper, the Sixth Circuit held the defendant’s 
distribution of software via the plaintiff’s servers, along with 
the underlying commercial nature of the relationship between 
the parties, to satisfy “minimum contacts.”74 An example of a 
passive website, at the other end of the Zippo scale, is the 
printable mail-in order form available on the defendant’s 
webpage in Mink v. AAAA Development, L.L.C.75 Finally, the 
case cited in Zippo as an example of an interactive website, in 
the middle of the sliding scale, is Maritz v. Cybergold, Inc.76 
That case concerned a website that allowed users to add their 
address to a mailing list which would send them updates 
about a forthcoming advertising service.77 
                                                          
 67. Id. at 1124. 
 68. See id. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. 
 72. CompuServe, Inc. v. Patterson, 89 F.3d 1257 (6th Cir. 1996). 
 73. See id. at 1266. 
 74. Id. at 1265-66. 
 75. Mink v. AAAA Development, L.L.C., 190 F.3d 333, 336 (5th Cir. 
1999) (adopting the Zippo test and concluding the defendant’s website was 
passive). 
 76. Maritz, Inc. v. Cybergold, Inc., 947 F. Supp. 1328 (E.D. Mo. 1996). 
 77. Id. at 1330. 
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In holding that the exercise of jurisdiction over Zippo Dot 
Com in Pennsylvania was proper, the Zippo opinion stated that 
the company’s website fell at the first end of the scale—the 
website actively targeted the forum state.78 Even though the 
company did not have any physical presence in Pennsylvania, 
it advertised its news service to the Internet public with the 
help of Internet service providers that had bases of operation 
in Pennsylvania.79 The problem with the test, however, is that 
in the middle of the scale, when analyzing interactive websites, 
Zippo encourages inquiry into the level of interactivity but does 
not describe a hard rule for analyzing the interactivity.80 No 
clear list of principles or judicial method for analyzing specific 
factual circumstances has been put forth to analyze the middle 
of the Zippo scale. Unfortunately, this is where questions of 
jurisdiction regarding interactive eBay transactions lie, and 
subsequent courts have found both for and against 
jurisdiction.81 
B. CASES AND STATUTES RELATED TO THE INTERNET AND 
PERSONAL JURISDICTION THROUGH EBAY SALES 
Many courts forced to wrestle with the question of 
personal jurisdiction over eBay Internet sellers have held on 
both sides of the Zippo scale. In a recent opinion concerning 
the Louisiana long-arm statute, which allows for jurisdiction 
within the limits of due process,82 a Louisiana appeals court 
upheld a trial court’s ruling which concluded that Louisiana 
had jurisdiction over a Texas recreational vehicle (“RV”) seller 
who advertised the vehicle on eBay.83 Despite the sale actually 
being consummated, and the vehicle paid for, in Texas, the 
court stated “the use of the eBay website to market and sell 
the RV to a Louisiana buyer is, on the Zippo sliding scale, more 
                                                          
 78. See Zippo, 952 F. Supp. at 1126–27. 
 79. Id. at 1126. 
 80. See Brian D. Boone, Comment, Bullseye!: Why a “Targeting” 
Approach to Personal Jurisdiction in the E-Commerce Context Makes Sense 
Internationally, 20 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 241, 257–58 (2006). 
 81. See discussion infra Part II.B. 
 82. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13:3201(B) (2006) (“A court of this state may 
exercise personal jurisdiction over a nonresident on any basis consistent 
with the constitution of this state and of the Constitution of the United 
States.”). 
 83. Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 503–05 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
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akin to those situations for which a finding of personal 
jurisdiction is proper.”84 The court continued: “Defendants 
used a variety of means of electronic communication to 
advertise, puff, negotiate, and accept payment for its product 
directed to a Louisiana consumer. Thus, sufficient minimum 
contacts, effectuated by electronic communications, have been 
established to maintain personal jurisdiction.”85 
Dissenting from the majority’s opinion, Judge Welch 
stated: 
In analyzing the facts of this case, the majority focuses 
“particularly” on Zippo’s “sliding scale,” and in doing so, they fail 
to consider the most important question in any personal 
jurisdiction due process inquiry – that is, whether the defendant 
has purposefully availed itself of the privilege of conducting 
activities within Louisiana, thus invoking the benefits and 
protections of its laws.86 
He went on to say that “the few contacts that the 
defendants did have with Louisiana by virtue of this and any 
other sale on eBay were the exact type of ‘random, fortuitous, 
or attenuated’ contacts that [the U.S. Supreme Court] intended 
to exclude from jurisdictional reach.”87 
Investigating further into opinions from other states 
reveals many jurists who agree with Judge Welch. In Sayeedi 
v. Walser88 a resident of New York brought an action for 
breach of contract against the defendant, a resident of 
Missouri, resulting from the sale of an automobile engine 
through eBay which was shipped to New York.89 The court 
concluded that, under these facts, “to summon the defendant 
into a New York court . . . would contravene the traditional 
notions of ‘fair play’ and ‘substantial justice’ that have become 
the ‘touchstone of personal jurisdiction.’”90 
In a similar case, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina 
held that the placement of an “Internet advertisement and one 
prior sale” to a resident of North Carolina did not constitute 
                                                          
 84. Id. at 503. 
 85. Id. at 504. 
 86. Id. at 508 (Welch, J., dissenting) (quoting the majority opinion, 
Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 504, and citing Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 
235, 253 (1958)). 
 87. Id. at 511 (quoting Burger King Corp. v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 
475 (1985)). 
 88. Sayeedi v. Walser, 835 N.Y.S.2d 840 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. 2007). 
 89. Id. at 841. 
 90. Id. at 846. 
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sufficient minimum contacts with North Carolina to comply 
with federal due process.91 The defendant’s “only contacts were 
the solicitation for bids on eBay, e-mails exchanged between 
the parties, and the wire transfer of money to defendant.”92  
The court stated further that “[i]n soliciting for bids on eBay, 
defendant does not target any particular state.”93 
Finally, in Metcalf v. Lawson,94 the Supreme Court of New 
Hampshire addressed a lower court ruling finding that New 
Hampshire had jurisdiction over a New Jersey defendant who 
sold an excavator on eBay.95 In holding that the defendant did 
not intentionally direct her activities at New Hampshire, the 
court concluded that “the defendant did not engage in 
sufficient activity in this State to make it fair and reasonable 
for purposes of due process to require her to defend [the claim 
in New Hampshire].”96 It is also of interest to note that while 
analyzing the case under the Zippo test, the court concluded 
“[t]he Zippo test is not particularly helpful in this case, 
however, because the majority of cases using it are based upon 
a defendant’s conduct over its own website. Unlike those 
cases, the transaction in this case was conducted through an 
Internet auction site.”97 
The most appropriate conclusion which can be drawn from 
a reading of these cases is that the law in this area is 
unsettled.  Courts around the country are having difficulty 
grasping how to address personal jurisdiction as it relates to e-
commerce in general and online auction sales in particular. 
III. PERSONAL JURISDICTION AND THE INTERNET IN 
GEORGIA AND OTHER STATES 
With a general understanding of the Georgia long-arm 
statute’s reach and the—albeit unsettled—extent of due 
process as it relates to Internet jurisdiction, we are now ready 
to look at the Georgia long-arm statute specifically to see how 
                                                          
 91. Buckland v. Hobbs, No. COA05-698, 2006 WL 695665, at *2 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 2006). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Metcalf v. Lawson, 802 A.2d 1221 (N.H. 2002). 
 95. Id. at 1224. 
 96. Id. at 1227. 
 97. Id. at 1226 (citations omitted). 
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Georgia courts analyze eBay sale jurisdiction issues within the 
confines of due process. 
A. AN EBAY CASE BEFORE ICCS 
Since the exercise of long-arm jurisdiction must be 
analyzed in terms of the long-arm statute first, and, if 
necessary, constitutional due process second, it is useful to 
look at Muir v. Assad, 98 a Georgia case which analyzes an 
eBay sale dispute prior to the Georgia Supreme Court’s ICCS 
opinion. This analysis, as compared to the later Aero decision, 
shows how a Georgia court may restrict itself by analyzing 
legislative intent99 with regard to  long-arm jurisdiction and 
prevent legal inequities from pulling an innocent out-of-state 
eBay user into Georgia. 
Muir is the first Georgia case to directly address the issue 
of long-arm jurisdiction over out-of-state online auction sellers. 
Muir, just like the Aero case, concerned a Georgia plaintiff who 
purchased a vehicle from an out-of-state eBay seller.100 The 
plaintiff sued the Washington state seller after the vehicle 
arrived in Georgia “allegedly in worse condition than 
advertised.”101 
In granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss based on 
lack of jurisdiction, Superior Court Judge Bessen 
acknowledged that other jurisdictions recognize evolving 
concepts of personal jurisdiction; however, he stated that “this 
Court is . . . constrained to follow existing law.”102 He reviewed 
prior Georgia Supreme Court opinions which attempted to 
interpret the long-arm statute broadly, but then stated that the 
supreme court’s opinion in Gust v. Flint103 led lower courts to 
adopt a narrowed interpretation of the statute.104 In the end, 
Judge Bessen criticized the limited interpretation of the long-
arm statute, and stated “our courts’ interpretations of the 
                                                          
 98. Muir v. Assad, No. Civ. A. 05VS079202J, 2005 WL 3367697 (Ga. 
Super. Ct. Aug. 24, 2005). 
 99. Less than a year after the Muir opinion, the Georgia Supreme 
Court ruled in ICCS that the assumed legislative intent in Muir, and the 
cases it cites, was incorrect. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., 
L.L.C. v. First Nat’l Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 2005). 
 100. Muir, 2005 WL 3367697, at *1. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. at *2–*3. 
 103. Gust v. Flint, 356 S.E.2d 513 (Ga. 1987). 
 104. Muir, 2005 WL 3367697, at *2. 
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[long-arm statute] have not met its intended and declared 
policy. . . . [O]ur decisions may not provide Georgians who are 
damaged by nonresidents a forum in this state to the fullest 
extent permitted by . . . the U.S. Constitution.”105 
Accordingly, the Muir opinion shows that while the 
constitutional limits of due process on the Internet are not 
clearly defined, the specific words and intent of a long-arm 
statute, as interpreted by courts, will be followed. 
Unfortunately, post-ICCS, the intent of the Georgia legislature 
has been construed to allow only for constitutional limits to 
long-arm jurisdiction, and the Georgia Court of Appeals has 
interpreted that to allow jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay 
users. The question then becomes whether Judge Bessen was 
correct in assuming that Georgians would benefit the most by 
allowing a forum to the fullest extent permitted by the U.S. 
Constitution. 
B. POST ICCS ANALYSIS AND AERO 
Since the Georgia Supreme Court’s ICCS opinion 
determined that earlier cases, including Muir, conflicted with 
the notion that the long-arm statute permits maximum 
jurisdiction,106 analyzing jurisdiction over Internet merchants 
in Georgia post-ICCS requires only a consideration of whether 
a merchant’s contacts with the state permits the exercise of 
jurisdiction over the merchant within “the maximum extent 
permitted by procedural due process.”107 The first Georgia case 
to directly address the issue of long-arm jurisdiction over out-
of-state online auction sellers after ICCS is Aero Toy Store, 
L.L.C. v. Grieves.108 
As described earlier,109 the Aero case dealt with a Georgia 
resident’s purchase of a vehicle from a Florida auto dealer who 
advertised the car on eBay.110 After receiving the vehicle in 
Georgia, the buyer filed suit against the seller in Georgia for 
                                                          
 105. Id. at *3. 
 106. See Innovative Clinical & Consulting Servs., L.L.C. v. First Nat’l 
Bank of Ames, 620 S.E.2d 352, 355 (Ga. 2005). 
 107. See Aero Toy Store, L.L.C. v. Grieves, 631 S.E.2d 734, 739 (Ga. Ct. 
App. 2006). 
 108. Id. 
 109. See infra Introduction. 
 110. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 735. 
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making numerous misrepresentations about the car.111 When 
Aero motioned to dismiss the suit based on lack of jurisdiction, 
the trial court found, and the Court of Appeals affirmed, that 
Aero established sufficient minimum contacts with Georgia to 
authorize Georgia’s exercise of personal jurisdiction under the 
long-arm statute.112 
The court began its analysis of jurisdiction based on 
Internet communications by stating: 
In other jurisdictions, a line of decisions has developed 
recognizing the technological revolution ushered in by the 
Internet and utilizing a sliding scale for determining whether a 
nonresident has submitted to a state’s long arm jurisdiction by 
establishing the requisite minimum contacts through Internet-
based activity.  This sliding scale was initially articulated in Zippo 
Mfg. Co. v. Zippo Dot Com.113 
After citing Zippo, the Aero court cited two more local 
cases regarding minimum contacts and the Internet.114 The 
first case was Butler v. Beer Across America,115 where an 
Alabama minor ordered twelve beers from sellers in Illinois 
through the sellers’ Internet website.116 The second case was 
Barton Southern Co. v. Manhole Barrier Systems,117 where a 
Georgia manhole security device manufacturing company filed 
suit in federal court against a similar New York company for 
trademark infringement.118 The Georgia company argued that 
the New York company’s website allowed for jurisdiction in 
Georgia because it permitted filling out company order forms 
and exchanging information with customers.119 
While the Aero court admitted both cited cases did not find 
for jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants, the court 
distinguished the Butler and Barton facts from the Aero facts, 
because the Aero defendant “operated an interactive website 
                                                          
 111. Id. 
 112. Id. at 736, 741. 
 113. Id. at 739–40. 
 114. Id. at 740. 
 115. Butler v. Beer Across Am., 83 F. Supp. 2d 1261 (N.D. Ala. 2000). 
 116. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Butler, 83 F. Supp. 2d at 1266–67). 
 117. Barton S. Co. v. Manhole Barrier Sys., 318 F. Supp. 2d 1174 (N.D. 
Ga. 2004). 
 118. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740 (citing Barton, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1174). 
 119. Barton, 318 F. Supp. 2d at 1177–78.  It is interesting to note that 
the district court in this case improperly states that the Georgia long-arm 
statute allows for jurisdiction to the maximum extent permitted by due 
process, which was not the case prior to the ICCS decision. See id. at 
1176. 
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through which it reached out to, and [did] business with, 
persons in Georgia.”120 The court specifically pointed out that 
“[u]nlike the situation in Butler, the [Aero] car was shipped into 
Georgia by the nonresident seller and not by a carrier acting as 
the resident buyer’s agent . . . .”121 While the court found that 
Aero did “not have officers, employees, offices, or business 
affiliates in Georgia, and although the revenue [Aero] derives 
from goods sold [in Georgia] may not be substantial,” the court 
stated Aero did “regularly solicit business in Georgia through 
the Internet” and held that the revenue it derived was “enough 
to establish sufficient minimum contacts.”122 Thus, the court 
held that with sufficient minimum contacts established, 
jurisdiction over Aero would not violate due process and would 
be proper. 
C. OTHER STATES WITH SIMILAR STATUTES 
Despite the Court of Appeals of Georgia holding in Aero 
that after ICCS, the Georgia long-arm statute would allow for 
jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users, other state appellate 
courts have held differently. For example, in Kolberg v. 
Channell123 the State of Massachusetts Appellate Division 
Court ruled against jurisdiction over a West Virginia defendant 
eBay vehicle seller.124 The Massachusetts statute at issue in 
the case reads exactly the same as the Georgia long-arm 
statute: “[a] court may exercise personal jurisdiction over a 
person . . . as to a cause of action . . . arising from the person’s 
[ ] transacting any business in this commonwealth . . . .”125 
While the Massachusetts case law history regarding the statue 
does not parallel the interpretations of the statute quite like 
the Georgia (pre- and post-ICCS) history, the Kolberg opinion 
analyzes the issue of personal jurisdiction over the out-of-state 
eBay seller under the statutory language and due process 
minimum contacts.126 Both analyses resulted in the court 
                                                          
 120. Aero, 631 S.E.2d at 740. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. at 740–41. 
 123. Kolberg v. Channell, 2006 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **1 (Mass. 
App. Div. 2006). 
 124. Id. at **7. 
 125. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 223A, § 3(a) (West 2000); Kolberg, 2006 
Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **2. 
 126. Kolberg, 2006 Mass. App. Div. LEXIS 8, at **4–**7. 
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finding the defendant’s contacts with Massachusetts 
“insufficient to constitute the transaction of business in 
Massachusetts.”127 
When analyzing the facts of the case as compared to the 
statutory language, the Massachusetts court stated that “the 
purposeful and successful solicitation of business from 
residents of the Commonwealth will generally satisfy [the 
transacting any business] requirement, but an isolated and 
minor transaction with a Massachusetts resident is 
insufficient.”128 Since “the only connection” between the 
plaintiff, Kolberg, and the defendant, Channell, in the case was 
“the advertisement on eBay for the sale of the [vehicle],” the 
court held that the defendant did not “satisfy the statutory 
requirement even with the benefit of a broad construction of its 
provisions.”129 In differentiating the facts at issue from cases 
the plaintiff cited to support jurisdiction, the court stated: 
These cases are readily distinguishable from this case because 
Channell did not sell the [vehicle] to Kolberg from his own 
personal or business website.  Rather, he placed the item for sale 
to the highest bidder on eBay.  Channell did not maintain eBay’s 
website, he only maintained a minimally interactive listing . . . . In 
this case, eBay chose the winning bidder.130 
With respect to the jurisdictional analysis under the 
Constitution’s due process requirements, the Massachusetts 
appellate court stated, “Channell’s sale of the [vehicle] on eBay 
to Kolberg was random and established only an attenuated 
connection to Massachusetts. Channell could not reasonably 
anticipate being subject to a lawsuit in Massachusetts based 
on this act.”131 
Kolberg v. Channell illustrates that courts in different 
states with identical long-arm statutory language to interpret 
have nevertheless drawn different conclusions on its meanings 
as compared to Georgia courts. Additionally, Kolberg shows 
again how courts interpreting the issue of constitutional 
minimum contacts on the Internet keep arriving at different 
conclusions. For these reasons, the Georgia legislature must 
                                                          
 127. Id. at **7. 
 128. Id. at **3–**4 (citing Tatro v. Manor Care, Inc., 625 N.E.2d 549 
(Mass. 1994) and Sullivan v. Hotown N.V., 1998 Mass. App. Div. 106, 108 
(Mass. Dist. Ct. 1998)). 
 129. Id. at **4. 
 130. Id. at **5. 
 131. Id. at **9. 
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specify, in the language of the statute, a clear intent based on 
the best policy of encouraging commerce and equity. 
IV. DIRECTIONS FOR THE LEGISLATURE 
With the problems and inconsistencies associated with the 
current Georgia long-arm statute established, we are now 
ready to look at a new direction for the statute as it relates to 
jurisdiction over online auction sellers and others. 
A. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS FAVORING JURISDICTION OVER 
ONLINE AUCTION SELLERS 
State policymakers traditionally believe citizens should be 
able to seek redress within their own state to the greatest 
extent possible for claims against nonresidents.132 Providing 
an in-state forum for resident businesses mitigates the cost of 
litigating suits against out-of-state defendants and improves 
the state’s business climate for smaller companies who have a 
single location and are more sensitive to litigation expenses.133 
Additionally, since the nonresident defendant is often enjoying 
the benefits and protections of the state’s laws, it is typically in 
the state’s interests to regulate business activities affecting its 
citizens within the plaintiff-resident’s state courts.134 
With respect to eBay sales in particular, policies favoring 
jurisdiction over nonresident defendants allow buyers to feel 
comfortable that purchases will not be fraught with fraud or 
false advertising. Since the cost would be great for sellers to 
defend themselves in foreign legal actions, they would be more 
inclined to advertise truthfully and settle matters before 
litigation with foreign buyers ensues.135 Thus, the legislature’s 
goal is to have its state codes, and courts, regulate business 
activities affecting its citizens and scare, with litigation 
expense, out-of-state sellers into truthful advertising and 
pretrial settlement. 
                                                          
 132. Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 345. 
 133. See id. at 347. 
 134. See Rhodes, supra note 20, at 163. 
 135. See Crummey v. Morgan, 965 So. 2d 497, 504 (La. Ct. App. 2007). 
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B. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS DISCOURAGING JURISDICTION OVER 
ONLINE AUCTION SELLERS 
Policy reasons against maximum jurisdiction generally 
center on ensuring personal jurisdiction that is predictable 
and consistent.136 Long-arm laws that allow for jurisdiction to 
the maximum extent permissible under the Constitution force 
state courts and practitioners to be at the mercy of federal 
courts to define what is acceptable. Since the interpretation of 
federal law varies from district to district and circuit to circuit, 
a clearly defined statute for long-arm jurisdiction that is 
undoubtedly within the confines of due process is required in 
order to bring about a predictable and consistent 
application.137 Additionally, a policy that does not allow 
residents to overextend the reach of state courts allows out-of-
state businesses to feel more comfortable conducting business 
with a certain state’s residents.138 
With respect to eBay sales specifically, the mere existence 
of an e-commerce rule which allows buyers to subject any 
seller to personal jurisdiction would clearly inhibit 
transactions—more so than any buyer wary of being forced to 
litigate in the home court of out-of-state sellers.139 
Furthermore, the variances in jurisdictional reach would make 
it practical for online sellers to preclude certain buyers from 
participating in online auctions due to their state’s rules 
despite a buyer making an individual informed decision of 
transacting with a specific seller. The effect could be a do-not-
sell list where sellers assess the risk of selling to certain buyers 
to be far greater than the benefit.  In contrast, if a buyer were 
wary of a foreign seller, the buyer could simply conduct more 
research into the seller and its products, or the buyer could 
choose to purchase from a local seller. 
C.  WHAT IS REALLY FAIR? 
Most commentators agree that the “fairness factors” 
should be the deciding issue when qualitative and quantitative 
contacts analyses result in no clear jurisdictional 
                                                          
 136. See Van Detta & Kapoor, supra note 33, at 348 
 137. Id. 
 138. See George M. Perry et al., Where Can You Be Sued, and Whose 
Laws Apply?, 7 MEDIA L. & POL’Y 1, 12 (1998). 
 139. See Crummey, 965 So. 2d at 511 (Welch, J., dissenting). 
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conclusions.140 Traditional notions of fair play is also the 
second step in the International Shoe minimum contacts test. 
Since requisite contacts may or may not be established in e-
commerce jurisdiction cases, and the policies for both allowing 
and not allowing jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users 
stack rather evenly, the final legislative decision regarding 
eBay transactions should rest upon an evaluation of 
equity/fairness. 
Haling an out-of-state eBay defendant-seller into a foreign 
jurisdiction to litigate a dispute regarding the sale results in 
three fundamental fairness issues. First, in order to complete 
the sale to a plaintiff-buyer, it is the plaintiff-buyer who must 
proactively access the eBay website, browse through the many 
listings, and then systematically pick and bid on a specific 
item from a specific seller. In contrast, the seller merely posts 
the advertisement onto the third party eBay website and waits 
for eBay to choose a winning bidder as the Massachusetts 
appellate court in Kolberg noted. Second, an eBay seller-
defendant does not target any specific buyer. While an eBay 
product listing may be tailored to a certain buyer’s needs, it 
cannot be targeted to a particular state. In contrast, a buyer 
can search for products in a certain geographical area and 
thereby ensure a home state forum should a dispute arise.  
Finally, an eBay seller-defendant may not have her own store, 
business, or even website.  Posting a product for sale on eBay 
is much simpler than hosting an interactive webpage with 
online ordering tools, contact phone numbers, and capabilities 
to process payments. The eBay website works by creating a 
huge marketplace that people come to for one-stop shopping 
and functions that allow buyers and sellers to reduce risk by 
essentially not dealing with each other directly.141 
Due to these fundamental fairness issues—which all weigh 
against allowing jurisdiction over out-of-state eBay users—and 
                                                          
 140. See Nemeyer, supra note 58, at 183 (citing Charles W. “Rocky” 
Rhodes, Clarifying General Jurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807, 887 
(2004)). 
 141. For example, eBay’s PayPal site allows buyers to pay eBay with a 
standard credit card or bank account.  After eBay receives the funds, 
sellers receive the money directly from eBay. See PayPal, About Us, 
https://www.paypal-media.com/aboutus.cfm (last visited Mar. 25, 2009). 
Thus sellers do not have to deal with a potentially fraudulent buyer, and 
buyers do not have to give their personal information directly to a seller. 
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the other ambiguities regarding the Georgia long-arm statute, 
it is necessary for the Georgia State Legislature to revisit the 
statutory language and clarify the intent of the current long-
arm statute. The Legislature should ensure that courts have 
clear guidelines to follow when determining whether they have 
jurisdiction over out-of-state residents. Furthermore, the 
Legislature should specifically write into the statute or 
legislative history that jurisdiction should not be granted over 
out-of-state residents who have merely used a third party 
auction website to conduct a transaction over the Internet. In 
this way the Georgia long-arm statute application would return 
back to the more refined days of Muir, and the Georgia 
Legislature, as opposed to the Georgia courts, would be the 
ultimate policy maker in business litigation jurisdiction issues. 
CONCLUSION 
Few eBay sellers understand that through a simple eBay 
sale, they could be haled into court on the opposite side of the 
country litigating with a buyer over the transaction under the 
buyer’s state’s rules. With the popularity of e-commerce sites 
growing, and the jurisdiction of state long-arm statues 
increasing, this issue is only going to become more important. 
Georgia, and any other state, could be placed on a “do or do-
not- sell list” for eBay and other online sellers to target buyers 
who have a lower risk of subjecting the seller to legal liability. 
In order to prevent this problem, and to address the issue 
of overreaching jurisdiction, Georgia, and other state 
legislatures, should revisit their respective long-arm statutes.  
Amended statutes should ensure that courts have clear 
guidelines to follow when determining whether they have 
jurisdiction over out-of-state residents. Further, an amended 
statute should make explicit that jurisdiction will not be 
permitted over out-of-state residents who have merely used a 
third party website to conduct a transaction over the Internet. 
 
 
